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August 2008
REAL CHANGE OR RETRENCHMENT?
Douglas V. Johnson II
It is frequently asserted in our 0930 daily kaffe klatsch that as soon as the
insurgency phenomenon in Iraq and Afghanistan is suppressed, the Army reflexively
will return to its fixation on the kinetic approach to major combat. It is also popular to
hold up the post-Vietnam era as a demonstration of that phenomenon with occasional
references to similar reactions following the suppression of the Philippine Insurrection.
These facile analyses are adduced to support the American Army’s distaste for
counterinsurgency work. To be honest, standing professional armies do not like
counterinsurgency work under the very best of conditions. Such undertakings are
almost as much, if not more, political-social-economic activities than military, and, if
ever there were a “clash of civilizations,” it would be here. But it all requires some
deeper consideration.
Following the suppression of the Philippine Insurrection, the final phase of the
Spanish-American War, the American Army went through several phase changes. It
could not wholly ignore counterinsurgency thinking because, however pacified the
Philippines appeared, residual rebellious groups were always smoldering on the more
remote islands. Cuba was administered by the Army for only a mercifully short period,
and Puerto Rico posed no problems. The next activity into which the Army was drawn
had little or nothing to do with insurgency, and this is always what matters most in
terms of orientation. The Russo-Japanese War burst upon the scene, and the results
thereof frightened West Coast residents to the point that the president had to go to
California to calm matters. One might well argue that the Boer War should have been
enough to keep the lessons alive, but that was not an insurgency of the kind that fit the
present mold—it was bodies of civilized white men fighting a semi-conventional war in
such a remote part of the world that the consequences could hardly have any effect
upon America. What mattered was that the previously pressing Philippine insurgency
had been suppressed, and a new war had broken out—a new war that saw the revival
of late American Civil War-like entrenchments augmented by that other American
invention, barbed-wire. If that were not enough, machine guns made their first
significant appearances along with rapid-fire artillery.
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The Balkan Wars of the 1910s seem to have made no particular impression on
anyone in the United States although they, too, showed off the employment of more
modern weaponry. But who cared about “some damn thing in the Balkans”?
When Pancho Villa raided the American border, it was as part of a civil war among
multiple parties in Mexico, but again nothing particularly resembling an insurgency
that mattered to the United States. For the American Army, Villa’s raids were little more
than a return to the Indian fighting days not so long gone.
In short, the evident trend in warfare was away from insurgency and toward a new
form of what we might call semi-modern warfare.
Following the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army avoided internal collapse partly by
refocusing its energies on recovering the ground lost in Europe during that decade.
Taking the nuclear-colored threat in Europe as its focal point, the Army underwent a
training revolution, produced two complete revisions of its operational doctrine, and
reequipped itself for offensive combat on the plains and among the towns of centralwestern Europe—principally Germany. No time, money, or space was available for
something that posed no threat comparable to that of the tank and nuke-heavy Warsaw
Pact hordes. Yes, the soldiers of the Special Operations Forces kept counterinsurgency
doctrine alive, if barely so, because conceptually that was their bread and butter, but not
in the principal theater—central Europe.
Some day the war in Iraq will end. If matters progress according to proper form,
the “lessons” of this war will be captured. They may or may not be “learned.” They
may or may not be taught because the next conflict will call for the attention of the
profession far too often charged with attempting to “refight the last war.” The charge
that the Army will automatically revert to the study of “tank armies on the plains of
central somewhere” is too facile. The direction of professional study and leader
development will have more to do with two simple things: the first will be shape of the
next challenge—will it be another insurgency, a nuclear-rattling Russia aggressing
against its southern former substates, a post-Olympics challenge to the United States
over Taiwan? Second, and arguably most important, will be the promotion lists. The
last list was touted as demonstrating the influence of the “Petreaus school.” If
subsequent lists repeat that phenomenon, heavy maneuver advocates, while rightly
reminding us that theirs is an essential skill for an Expeditionary Army whose
destination and foe remain unidentified, will lose their previous dominance. Promotion
lists have been the most effective tool available to establish and maintain professional
direction in the past and will most certainly work in the future. Joint service was a
meaningless waste of time, or worse, until that form of service was established as a
pathway to professional advancement by instructions to promotion boards.
Another factor may well inhibit a return to the principally kinetic school. The cost
of attempting to revive all the worn out equipment that emerged to underwrite the
possibility of meaningful defense of central Europe in the mid to late 1980s defies full
measurement. To attempt to restore the old would cripple progress toward a balanced
force approaching the kind of broad spectrum capability the unknowable future will
require. The momentum of the Future Combat System, a true system of systems and not
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a platform-centric program, will provide support to the middle ground that is most
likely to dominate. The present momentum behind that program, coupled with the
obviously destructive effect of attempting to recover past capabilities of less certain
relevance, may act to reinforce development of new capabilities.
It is easy to argue that nobody likes doing counterinsurgency because it is so messy.
For the really cynical, counterinsurgencies produce few “heroic” figures in the news,
although in truth they produce many quiet heroes at least as worthy of emulation as the
Audie Murphys of conventional war. But it isn’t about what the profession “likes,” it is
about what the threat requires and what senior professionals value.
What will really matter in the long run will be whether the services, the Army in
particular, will be able to maintain momentum toward effective interagency work. The
motivations in the civilian departments of government may or may not be sufficient to
maintain the impetus to work together toward a common end and will inevitably react
to budgetary competition. But this work will be necessary regardless of the dominant
Army doctrinal school.
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